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Tadeusz A. Olszański
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church (UAOC) have submitted a request to the Ecumenical Patriarch (i.e. the pa-
triarch of Constantinople, the supreme head of all Orthodox Churches) to grant autocephaly 
to Ukrainian Orthodoxy. On 19 April the Ukrainian parliament, at the request of President 
Petro Poroshenko, expressed its support for this measure. The President himself expressed his 
support on 22 April. There are numerous indications that a positive decision regarding this 
issue has already been made, and a relevant thomos (patriarch’s decree) will be announced 
any time this year Proclamation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Particular Orthodox Church 
(Ukrayinska Pomisna Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva, UAPOC) will likely trigger a new wave 
of confessional conflicts across Ukraine, including a likely schism in the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church, which recognizes the primacy of the patriarch of Moscow (UOC). It is beyond any 
doubt that a certain portion of believers and clergy, which today is difficult to estimate, will 
remain loyal to Moscow and that the Moscow Patriarchate will make every effort to support 
Ukrainian structures of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The government of Ukraine, for 
its part, will try to prevent the development of these structures. 
From the political point of view, both the expected granting of autocephaly to Ukrainian Ortho-
doxy and the likely conflicts resulting from this are favourable to President Poroshenko because 
they increase both his and his party’s chances of re-election in the elections planned for 2019. 
On the one hand, he will gain new trust from patriotically minded voters, on the other hand, 
opponents of autocephaly will coalesce around pro-Russian parties. This in turn may help pro-
mote a pro-Russian politician to compete with Poroshenko in the second round of presidential 
voting as a weak counter-candidate whom the current president would defeat relatively easily. 
Ukrainian Orthodoxy:  
a historical perspective
Kyivan Rus, the predecessor of Ukraine, Belarus 
and the north-western part of Russia, adopted 
Christianity 1030 years ago. The Kyivan Metro-
politanate created back then quickly gained au-
tocephaly (canonical independence), though 
between 1299 and 1458 the Metropolitans of 
Kyiv and All-Russia resided in Vladimir on the 
Klyazma River, and later in Moscow. In 1458, 
the Moscow Metropolitanate unilaterally 
broke away from the Kyiv Metropolitanate, 
and in 1589 the Moscow Metropolitans were 
conferred the rank of patriarchs. A century 
later, against the will of the Ecumenical Pa-
triarch, the Moscow patriarchs subordinated 
the Kyiv Metropolitanate to themselves and 
forced the Ecumenical Patriarch’s approval ex 
post (the approval was annulled in 1924), and 
it has remained this way until now. However, 
it is beyond question that, from a canonical 
point of view, it is the Constantinople Church, 
rather than the Moscow Church, which is 
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Kyiv’s Mother Church. At present, this is also 
the opinion of the Ecumenical Patriarch1.
During the Ukrainian war for independence 
(1917-1921), in an act of 1 January 1919 the 
Directorate of the Ukrainian People’s Republic 
(UNR) proclaimed the creation of the Ukraini-
an Autocephalous Synodal Orthodox Church, 
which was confirmed by the Orthodox council 
in May 1920. After a short period of develop-
ment, this Church was destroyed by the Com-
munist regime and survived in exile only.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the autoceph-
alous Church in exile returned to Ukraine. In the 
same period, there was a schism in the structures 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It was 
the community centred around this Church that 
formulated the demand cited in the title of this 
paper, which became a slogan of the Ukrainian 
patriotic-confessional movement. However, no 
agreement was reached between the support-
ers of the ‘imported’ Church and the followers of 
the ‘schism’ Church. As a consequence, not two 
but three Orthodox structures were formed in 
Ukraine: UOC, UOC-KP and UAOC, of which only 
the first one (the one that recognizes the prima-
cy of the Moscow patriarch) was considered le-
gitimate by the Orthodox world. The schism was 
accompanied by numerous conflicts over who 
may use specific churches, frequently involving 
acts of violence, sometimes with the participa-
tion of nationalist militants.  
During the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma and 
Viktor Yanukovych, the UOC enjoyed support 
1 Communiqué of the Holy and Sacred Synod, 22 April 2018, 
http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=gr&id=247tla=gr
from the state. President Viktor Yushchenko, for 
his part, supported the UOC-KP and attempted 
to have this Church recognized by the Ecumen-
ical Patriarchate, to no avail. Initially, the UOC 
had been the dominant structure, but social 
support for the Kyiv Patriarchate continued to 
rise gradually2. According to the most recent 
data, the UOC has 52 dioceses and 12,000 par-
ishes, and the UOC-KP – 35 dioceses and 5,000 
parishes (the UAOC with its 14 dioceses and 
a thousand parishes remains of secondary im-
portance)3. The estimates regarding the num-
ber of believers are divergent and not gener-
ally credible. However, the recently published 
results of a survey of Ukrainian people’s reli-
gious awareness4 indicate that in recent years 
researchers recorded a stable increase in the 
number of believers who identify with the Kyiv 
Patriarchate and a drop in the number of those 
who support the UOC. Similarly, a drop in the 
number of people who consider themselves 
‘simply believers in Orthodoxy’ has also been 
recorded (these respondents are partly indiffer-
ent to confessional disputes and partly choose 
not to disclose their preferences). According to 
these data (announced in the spring of 2018), 
42.6% of the respondents who considered 
themselves Orthodox Christians declared that 
they belonged to the UOC-KP, 0.4% to UAOC, 
19.1% to UOC, and 34.8% said they were ‘sim-
ply believers in Orthodoxy’. At the same time, 
‘nationalisation’ of Ukrainian Orthodoxy was 
supported by 50% of all respondents (regard-
2 For more on religious and confessional affairs in Ukraine 
see: T. A. Olszański, A quarter-century of independent 
Ukraine. Dimensions of transformation, “OSW Studies” 
28 April 2017, p. 77-83, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-studies/2017-11-28/a-quarter-centu-
ry-independent-ukraine-dimensions-transformation; 
idem, The Western Borderlands. The place of Eastern 
Galicia and Volhynia in the Ukrainian state, “OSW Stud-
ies”, 4 July 2013, p. 65-76, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-studies/2013-07-04/summary-west-
ern-borderlands-place-eastern-galicia-and-volhynia 
3 Релігія і Церква в українському суспільстві: соціологічне 
дослідження-2018; 25 April 2018, http://razumkov.org.
ua/uploads/article/2018_Religiya.pdf This publication also 
contains documents regarding the attempts at autocepha-
ly, made available in late April 2018. 
4 Ibidem.
The very fact that the Ecumenical Patri-
arch received the request from the UOC-
KP and UAOC, which until recently were 
unrecognized by the Orthodox world, in-
dicates a positive decision regarding the 
matter.
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less of their declared faith): 27% of them sup-
ported the view that Ukrainian Orthodox Chris-
tians should unite under the primacy of the 
Kyiv Patriarchate, 23% were in favour of the 
creation of a new united Church. A mere 9% of 
the respondents said that  Ukrainian Orthodoxy 
should remain subordinated to the Moscow Pa-
triarchate. 
The canonical aspect
The very fact that the Ecumenical Patriarch re-
ceived the request from two structures that un-
til recently were denied the status of Churches 
by the Orthodox world indicates a major shift in 
Phanar’s approach towards this issue (Phanar is 
the seat of the Patriarch, just like the Vatican is 
the seat of the Pope). The announcement that 
the Patriarch will consider this request acting 
“as its [the Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s – author’s 
note] genuine Mother Church” is also of great 
importance5. In fact, this indicates a positive 
decision, which was most likely agreed at the 
meeting of Patriarch Bartholomew I with Presi-
dent Poroshenko during Easter (8-9 April 2018). 
It can also be seen as confirmation of a major 
drop in Moscow’s influence on the decisions 
taken by the Constantinople patriarch. Several 
years ago, Moscow was unable to prevent the 
patriarchal synod from rejecting the category 
of “canonical territory”, according to which the 
whole territory of the former Soviet Union (ex-
cluding Georgia)6 should remain in the jurisdic-
tion of the Moscow Patriarchate, regardless of 
5 Communiqué of the Holy and Sacred Synod, op. cit.
6 The Armenian Apostolic Church is not a part of the Or-
thodox world, Orthodox Christians living in Armenia 
(0.5% of the population) are followers of the Russian 
Orthodox Church.
the current political situation. This would also 
be against the tradition of harmonising the 
boundaries of specific Churches with state bor-
ders, which is typical of Orthodoxy. 
In 2016, Moscow practically frustrated the gen-
eral council of the Orthodox Church , the first 
in a thousand years, which was intended as Pa-
triarch Bartholomew I’s life’s work. The reasons 
behind this included the council’s intention to 
adopt the rules of granting autocephaly. The 
absence of a Russian delegation at the coun-
cil (and also of the delegations from Bulgaria, 
Georgia and the Antiochian Patriarchate with 
its seat in Damascus) has deprived the council 
of its intended universal reach and resulted in 
the issue of autocephaly being removed from 
the agenda. For this short-term success Mos-
cow is now likely to pay the price in the form 
of a strategic failure: Phanar has become more 
open to Kyiv’s suggestions.
At present, Moscow (both the Moscow 
Patriarchate and perhaps also the Russian 
government) and its supporters are forming 
a coalition to object to the recognition of 
Ukraine’s autocephaly. There have been reports 
suggesting that on 4 May 2018 Vadym Novin-
sky (Ukrainian oligarch and activist of the lay 
Orthodox community, supporter of the primacy 
of the Moscow Patriarchate) discussed this is-
sue with the head of the Polish Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church; it has been further reported 
that representatives of the Russian Orthodox 
Episcopate visited Warsaw to take part in these 
talks7. Other sources are suggesting that the 
Ecumenical patriarch and his milieu, as well as 
other autocephalous Orthodox Churches, are 
under strong pressure. 
If it is formed, the new Church will be an au-
tocephalous metropolitanate subordinated to 
Constantinople or a patriarchate. Kyiv is known 
to insist on the latter option, all the more so 
because the UOC-KP is already headed by a 
7 Cf. I. Kapsamun, Шанси на автокефалію, 7 May 2018, 
https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobyci/shansy-na-avtoke-
faliyu/
If it is formed, the new Church will be  
a patriarchate.
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patriarch, even if self-proclaimed. According 
to information from the Patriarch Filaret, the 
thomos is likely to be announced in July8, which 
means that a festive proclamation of autoceph-
aly in Kyiv will be possible on 28 July, i.e. on the 
1030th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus. If the 
decision is announced around this time, it will 
mean that external pressure has been success-
ful at least in part. 
The political aspect
For Ukraine’s political elites the issue of auto-
cephaly is of triple importance: strategic, tac-
tical and religious (in a private sense). The first 
aspect is obvious: today the UOC serves as 
a channel to spread Russia’s political and cul-
tural influence, a major portion of its clergy and 
its lay community is even challenging the inde-
pendent identity of Ukrainian culture, language 
and nation. Therefore, limiting the UOC’s in-
fluence is an important element of building 
a national identity, based on turning away from 
Moscow in every possible respect. A wide-
spread belief remains that an ‘independent’ 
(national) Church is an important attribute of 
political and civilisational sovereignty. 
Today, the tactical aspect is more important. 
In 2019, Ukraine will hold two elections: the 
presidential election in spring and parliamen-
tary election in autumn. Meanwhile, polls in-
dicate that President Poroshenko’s approval 
rating has dangerously dropped to single-digit 
figures, and in simulations of the second round 
of voting he is defeated by all his prospective 
counter-candidates9. Similarly, his party has lit-
tle chance of winning the parliamentary elec-
8 Филарет: Думаю, что в июле мы получим Томос 
и автокефалию, 31 May 2018, https://censor.net.ua/
video_news/3069005/filaret_dumayu_chto_v_iyule_
my_poluchim_tomos_i_avtokefaliyu_video 
9 KMIS survey results announced in mid-April; https://
www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/05/7/7179666/ For 
more on the pre-election situation in Ukraine see T. 
Iwański, Poroshenko stands alone. Ukraine politics in 




tion; it may even lose its status as a coalition 
forming party. However, due to the fact that 
Poroshenko intends to seek re-election, what 
he needs is an event that would erase the im-
pression held by patriotically-oriented and 
state-supporting voters that over the last five 
years Ukrainian government has been disap-
pointing and oligarchic in nature. 
The creation of a Kyiv Patriarchate that would 
be recognized by the Orthodox world (exclud-
ing Moscow and its satellites) as canonically 
legitimate, could represent one such success: 
Poroshenko could present himself as ‘the na-
tion’s unifier’ and ‘its liberator from Russian 
bondage’. Moreover, most of his opposing can-
didates, Yulia Tymoshenko in particular, would 
be unable to challenge this rhetoric. This would 
help Poroshenko to catapult Yuri Boyko – the 
only candidate he would defeat – into the sec-
ond round of voting.
The wave of conflicts that will likely accompany 
the unification of Orthodox structures (see be-
low) will also trigger a consolidation of a por-
tion of the Party of Regions’ former electorate 
around Yuri Boyko, an oligarch and leader of the 
Opposition Bloc (a party formed after the disso-
lution of the Party of Regions). He is the last ma-
jor leader on this side of the political scene (the 
above-mentioned ‘Orthodox oligarch’, Vadym 
Novinsky, is one of his sponsors). Such polari-
sation would enable Poroshenko to portray the 
second round as a clash of patriotic and dem-
ocratic forces with a national betrayal camp, 
and this might be enough to secure victory. 
In this situation, Poroshenko is playing for very 
high stakes (if not the highest). A refusal from 
the Ecumenical Patriarch, or even a major post-
ponement, concerning the decision to grant 
Poroshenko is playing a game of very 
high stakes. If Ukrainian Orthodoxy is not 
granted autocephaly, this will consider-
ably reduce his chance for re-election.
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Ukrainian Orthodoxy autocephaly, will consid-
erably reduce the current president’s prospects 
of re-election. This is why the opinions of many 
Kyiv-based observers, suggesting that when 
Poroshenko announced his decision he had al-
ready been informed that Bartholomew I’s de-
cision would be positive and favourable to him, 
are likely correct. 
Personal religious motivations are true for 
those politicians who treat their Orthodox re-
ligious view seriously. The current president is 
surely one of them. He is a pious man and an 
active member of the UOC, which he sees as 
the only source of valid sacraments. The fact 
that he does all this as the president of a coun-
try which is waging a hybrid war with Russia 
(which automatically includes religious issues 
as well) seems to be a source of discomfort for 
him and could have been one of his motives for 
taking up this issue. 
A certain ambiguity  in the Ukrainian state’s 
support for the Churches’ actions should not 
be disregarded. Firstly, this policy may be in-
terpreted as an infringement of the division 
between the Church and the state (this reser-
vation has been formulated by representatives 
of the UOC). Secondly, even today the Ukrain-
ian state does not recognize the existence of 
Churches as such. The Ukrainian legal system 
approves of the existence of ‘religious organisa-
tions’ only, i.e. parishes, seminaries, monaster-
ies, curias, but not deaneries and dioceses (this 
is a remnant of the Soviet approach to religious 
confessions). In practice, the state and the lo-
cal governments maintain contacts with major 
confessional structures and recognise their de 
facto existence. However, de iure there are no 
Churches in Ukraine. Consequently, the govern-
ment in Kyiv has requested Phanar to recognize 
structures that it itself does not recognize. 
From the perspective of conflicts that will likely 
be triggered by the unification of Orthodoxy, 
this legal situation will be favourable to Kyiv: 
disputes between specific parish communities 
in individual towns and cities will be settled 
by common courts, and the state will officially 
wash its hands of the issue to avoid being ac-
cused by the West of violating ‘the principle of 
world-view neutrality’. 
Prospects
Assuming that in his thomos Bartholomew I 
will announce the creation of the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Particular Orthodox Church, this 
will merely mark the beginning of the unifica-
tion process. Even the prospective unification of 
UOC-KP and UAOC will require a synod of the 
two Churches to be convened, for example, to 
harmonise the overlapping networks of dioceses 
and parishes. It is hard to imagine that this would 
proceed without any conflicts, such as over am-
bition-related issues. Another problem will be 
the election of a new Kyiv patriarch. It is almost 
certain that this honour will not be granted to 
the current patriarch, Filaret, due to both his ad-
vanced age (he was born in 1929) and the fact 
that he would be viewed as a rock of offence by 
the majority of clergymen and followers of the 
UOC inclined to  support ‘national unification’. 
A likely outcome is that the UOC will experience 
an open schism. It is suggested that the ranks 
of its clergy, and all the more so for its lay fol-
lowers, include a large number of supporters of 
a national Orthodox Church. (Their informal 
leader is Antonii, Metropolitan of Boryspil, once 
a close collaborator of Metropolitan Volodymyr, 
the former head of the UOC; the opponents of 
autocephaly are currently led by Onufry, the cur-
rent Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine, and 
Metropolitan Agafangel of Odesa, an open Rus-
sophile). The course of the unification process 
The merger of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Churches will create new problems and 
trigger conflicts which will likely involve 
acts of violence.
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will show how numerous this group is. Accord-
ing to recent announcements, those who choose 
to remain loyal to Moscow will have to formally 
change their status to that of an Exarchate of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. 
The merger of a portion of the UOC’s dioceses 
and parishes with the structures of the new 
Kyiv Patriarchate will create new problems 
and trigger conflicts which will likely involve 
acts of violence (this is unavoidable in a coun-
try that is so ‘saturated with arms’ and has so 
many war veterans). Many parishes will split, 
which means that they will fight for their 
right to specific churches. Numerous behind-
the-scenes interventions by state authorities 
to support the unification process are to be 
expected. These processes will likely last at 
least one year, during which time two elector-
al campaigns will be held. This, in turn, means 
that disputes are unlikely to be settled in 
a concilliatory  manner.
The expected creation of UAPOC will have 
consequences for the Greek Catholic commu-
nity. It cannot be ruled out that a portion of 
the followers and perhaps also of the clergy 
of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church will 
renounce unity with the Holy See in the name 
of national unity. In the poll cited above as 
many as 35% of Greek Catholic respond-
ents supported the creation of a common 
Orthodox Church. The concept of creating 
a “Ukrainian particular Church” understood 
as a unification of all Ukrainian structures of 
Eastern Christianity (and not only Orthodoxy) 
was very popular with Greek Catholics.
*
The consequences of the prospective unifica-
tion of Ukrainian Orthodoxy for the Russian 
Orthodox Church are another issue. This will be 
a major blow for the ROC both in terms of pres-
tige and in the organisational-financial aspect: 
as many as a third of its parishes are located in 
Ukraine. The ROC will not lose the entirety of 
its assets in Ukraine, but it will likely lose the 
status of the world’s largest Orthodox commu-
nity and will be weakened and humiliated as 
a result of this process. One cannot exclude the 
possibility that this will result in a ‘soft schism’, 
involving a refusal to maintain contacts with 
the Kyiv Patriarchate and a freezing of relations 
with Phanar. History has recorded one similar 
precedent: in the 15th century the Moscow Me-
tropolis rejected the decisions of the Council of 
Florence regarding the union between Rome 
and Constantinople, thereby positioning itself 
outside the universal Church. 
The consequences of such a reaction from the 
Moscow Patriarchate are hard to imagine. One 
possible consequence could be that the Holy 
See would be in big trouble, since in its ecu-
menical dialogue it is more oriented toward 
Russian Orthodoxy than Greek or Balkan Or-
thodoxy. This type of reaction or even a harsher 
one is possible, especially if the government in 
Moscow considers it favourable in the context 
of the goals of Russia’s policy towards not only 
Ukraine but also the West and the Middle East10.
10 It is no coincidence that in its fight against the Ecumen-
ical Patriarch, Moscow resorted to the Antiochian Patri-
archate which is dependent on the Assad regime. 
